Control 2.8: Encryption (Data in Transit and at Rest)
Control ID: 2.8 Pillar: Security & Protection Regulatory Reference: GLBA §501(b), FFIEC, NYDFS Part 500 Last Verified: 2026-09-29 Governance Levels: Baseline / Recommended / Regulated
Objective
Maintain a documented, evidence-based encryption posture for Microsoft 365 Copilot data flows. Review the Microsoft 365 service posture, capture actual negotiated TLS handshakes for representative endpoints, and review only the tenant-controlled encryption settings that apply to the workload, such as Exchange connectors, Customer Key, sensitivity labels, and Azure Key Vault or Managed HSM.
This control does not treat a reachability test, a client-side protocol preference, or unrelated Microsoft Graph tenant metadata as proof of service-wide encryption.
Why This Matters for FSI
- GLBA §501(b) requires safeguards for customer information; encryption is a technical safeguard that supports the broader program.
- NYDFS Part 500 §500.15 addresses encryption of nonpublic information in transit and at rest based on risk assessment.
- FFIEC IT Examination Handbook (Information Security) expects institutions to assess cryptographic controls, key management, and third-party service dependencies.
- OCC Bulletin 2023-17 makes it important to understand the control boundaries for cloud services that process institution data.
- PCI DSS, where applicable, and Sarbanes-Oxley §§302/404, where Copilot affects ICFR, can add organization-specific evidence needs.
Control Description
Encryption boundaries
| Boundary | Microsoft-documented posture | What this control verifies |
|---|---|---|
| Microsoft 365 transport | Microsoft 365 supports TLS 1.2. TLS 1.3 availability is being rolled out by individual applications and services. | A timestamped, negotiated handshake for each representative HTTPS endpoint in scope. |
| Microsoft 365 data at rest | Microsoft 365 documents multiple service encryption layers, including BitLocker, Distributed Key Manager, and workload-specific encryption. | A manual review of current Microsoft documentation and applicable Service Trust Portal evidence. |
| Customer Key | Customer Key adds customer-controlled root-key protection for data at rest. The tenant-level multi-workload DEP (MDEP) includes Microsoft 365 Copilot interactions. |
The multi-workload DEP and tenant assignment, onboarding state, plus the paired Azure Key Vault or Managed HSM configuration. |
| Double Key Encryption (DKE) | DKE is intended for data requiring the strictest protection. Microsoft documents that Copilot and agents cannot access DKE-protected data. | The approved DKE scope and the expected Copilot exclusion test. |
| Sensitivity-label encryption | Copilot evaluates usage rights for the requesting user, with documented surface and source exceptions. | Effective EXTRACT rights and the documented exceptions below, not merely a label's nominal configuration. |
| Device encryption | BitLocker or equivalent protects managed-device storage. | The organization’s endpoint compliance evidence, separately from Microsoft 365 service encryption. |
TLS policy and availability
| Protocol | Current Microsoft policy | Control interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| TLS 1.3 | Supported on a service- and application-dependent basis. Microsoft states that TLS 1.3 is being rolled out throughout Microsoft 365, and Exchange Online supports it for worldwide email submissions and third-party server communication. | Prefer it only when the selected client and endpoint actually negotiate it. Do not claim universal Microsoft 365 TLS 1.3 availability. |
| TLS 1.2 | Supported by all Microsoft 365 services. | Treat TLS 1.2 as the current baseline and record actual negotiation evidence. |
| TLS 1.0 / 1.1 | Microsoft’s technical reference states that support ended on October 31, 2018 and removal from the service was completed later, since 2022. Commercial Office 365 deprecation began October 15, 2020 and rolled out over subsequent weeks and months. | Do not describe these protocols as universally blocked in October 2018. |
| SMTP AUTH legacy exception | Exchange Online offers an opt-in legacy endpoint, smtp-legacy.office365.com, for legacy SMTP AUTH clients. It requires AllowLegacyTLSClients; this is a narrowly scoped exception, not a general Microsoft 365 transport setting. |
Inventory and retire this exception where present. Its setting is evidence only for that SMTP AUTH exception, not for Microsoft 365 HTTPS or all tenant traffic. |
| SSL 3.0 | Deprecated. | Do not use. |
Current Microsoft 365 TLS cipher suites
Microsoft documents the following currently supported suites in strength order. The negotiated suite remains endpoint-, client-, and time-specific, so capture it in handshake evidence rather than assuming that every suite is offered by every endpoint.
| Cipher suite | TLS version | Status |
|---|---|---|
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
1.3 | Supported |
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
1.3 | Supported |
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
1.2 | Supported |
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
1.2 | Supported |
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 |
1.2 | Supported |
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 |
1.2 | Supported |
Sensitivity-label encryption and Copilot
EXTRACT is user- and surface-specific
EXTRACT (shown as Copy) determines whether Copilot or an agent can display text from encrypted content for the requesting user. If the user has VIEW but not EXTRACT, Microsoft documents that Copilot does not summarize the item but can reference it with a link for the user to open outside Copilot. This is not a categorical “cannot access” rule:
- Full control (OWNER) includes EXTRACT. The person who applies encryption is the Rights Management owner and therefore has EXTRACT, even if the configured recipient permissions do not.
- For unopened SharePoint and OneDrive documents encrypted with user-defined permissions, Copilot normally cannot access the item unless it is a default label that extends SharePoint permissions or it is directly referenced with
/and the user has EXTRACT. An open document remains data in use and can be accessed for that user. - Unless Edge DLP is used, Copilot can reference encrypted content in the active Edge tab even when the user lacks EXTRACT, such as Office for the web or Outlook for the web content.
- Sensitivity labels and encryption applied to external data delivered through plugins or Microsoft Graph connectors are not recognized by Microsoft Copilot Chat; Power BI is a documented exception. Govern and test those sources separately.
DKE is different: Microsoft documents that DKE-protected items are not returned by Copilot or agents, and Copilot cannot be used in the app when a DKE item is open.
Customer Key and DKE
| Feature | Customer Key | DKE |
|---|---|---|
| Purpose | Adds customer-controlled root-key protection for supported Microsoft 365 data at rest. | Protects data where Microsoft must not access the customer-controlled key. |
| Copilot behavior | The tenant-level multi-workload DEP (MDEP) includes Microsoft 365 Copilot interactions; Customer Key is not a Copilot exclusion control. |
Copilot and agents cannot access DKE-protected data. |
| Evidence | DEP/onboarding status and the two-subscription key configuration. | Approved label configuration and an exclusion test. |
| Operational risk | Incorrect key management can interrupt access or cause data loss. | Customer key-service availability affects access to protected content. |
Copilot Surface Coverage
Apply evidence to the path actually in scope:
- Microsoft Copilot Chat and Office apps: Capture representative HTTPS handshakes and test sensitivity-label behavior as the requesting user.
- Exchange Online: Review connector and SMTP AUTH legacy-TLS evidence only when the tenant uses those mail-flow paths; it does not represent general Copilot HTTPS traffic.
- Teams and SharePoint/OneDrive: Use the Microsoft 365 service-boundary review, then test the applicable label, data-in-use, and Customer Key scenario, including the multi-workload DEP where it is deployed.
- Plugins and Microsoft Graph connectors: Treat external-source label/encryption behavior as a separate test scope because Microsoft Copilot Chat does not generally recognize that metadata.
Governance Levels
| Level | Requirement | Evidence boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Baseline | Review current Microsoft 365 service-encryption documentation; collect negotiated TLS handshake evidence for representative approved endpoints; document DKE and sensitivity-label limitations. | A handshake shows one actual connection, not a tenant-wide guarantee. |
| Recommended | Review connector TLS or mutual-TLS settings where the tenant uses partner or hybrid mail flow; evaluate Customer Key and DKE for the approved data categories; review key-recovery controls if Customer Key is deployed. | Connector settings apply only to their configured mail-flow paths. |
| Regulated | Add a documented recurring evidence review, customer key-management ownership, DKE scope decision, and current HSM validation evidence where the organization requires that assurance level. Prefer TLS 1.3 only when the endpoint and client negotiate it. | Retain the endpoint list, timestamps, configuration exports, and exception decisions. |
Setup & Configuration
Step 1: Capture negotiated TLS evidence
Use the PowerShell setup playbook to record the negotiated protocol, cipher suite, certificate subject, and timestamp for representative HTTPS endpoints. A TCP reachability check and a client-wide protocol preference are not TLS-version evidence.
Select endpoints from the organization’s approved Microsoft 365/Copilot endpoint inventory and retain both the endpoint list and the handshake output. Do not extrapolate one endpoint’s result to every Microsoft 365 workload.
Step 2: Review the Microsoft 365 service boundary manually
There is no tenant-wide Microsoft 365 Admin Center encryption setting that establishes service encryption. Review the current Microsoft 365 encryption documentation and the organization’s applicable Service Trust Portal evidence instead. Record the document/report version, review date, and any workload-specific caveat.
Step 3: Prepare Customer Key correctly, if it is in scope
Customer Key requires two distinct paid Azure subscriptions. Free, Trial, Sponsorship, MSDN, and Legacy Support subscriptions are not eligible. Create one Azure Key Vault (Standard or Premium) vault, or one Managed HSM instance, in each subscription for each Customer Key scenario; a pair of vaults in one subscription is not compliant.
For Azure Key Vault, Customer Key requires soft delete and purge protection at creation with a 90-day retention period. Microsoft supports Standard or Premium vaults, but recommends Premium vaults with HSM-protected keys for production data and Standard only for testing or validation. Customer Key guidance requires separate vault pairs for Multiple Workloads, Exchange, and SharePoint/OneDrive when all three Azure Key Vault scenarios are used. Managed HSM uses two instances, one per subscription, across Customer Key workloads.
# Placeholder values only. Do not reuse a subscription for both entries.
# Example shows the production-recommended Premium vault configuration.
$vaults = @(
[pscustomobject]@{
SubscriptionId = '<paid-subscription-1-guid>'
ResourceGroup = 'rg-customer-key-1'
VaultName = 'ckm365vault01'
Location = 'EastUS'
KeyName = 'm365-customer-key'
},
[pscustomobject]@{
SubscriptionId = '<paid-subscription-2-guid>'
ResourceGroup = 'rg-customer-key-2'
VaultName = 'ckm365vault02'
Location = 'WestUS'
KeyName = 'm365-customer-key'
}
)
if ($vaults.Count -ne 2 -or @($vaults.SubscriptionId | Select-Object -Unique).Count -ne 2) {
throw 'Customer Key requires two distinct paid Azure subscriptions.'
}
foreach ($vault in $vaults) {
Set-AzContext -SubscriptionId $vault.SubscriptionId | Out-Null
New-AzResourceGroup -Name $vault.ResourceGroup -Location $vault.Location -Force | Out-Null
New-AzKeyVault -Name $vault.VaultName `
-ResourceGroupName $vault.ResourceGroup `
-Location $vault.Location `
-Sku Premium `
-SoftDeleteRetentionInDays 90 `
-EnablePurgeProtection | Out-Null
Add-AzKeyVaultKey -VaultName $vault.VaultName `
-Name $vault.KeyName -Destination HSM | Out-Null
}
The more detailed subscription-context provisioning and verification procedure is in the PowerShell setup playbook.
Step 4: Validate before enabling Customer Key
For the Microsoft 365 Copilot scope, the tenant-level multi-workload DEP (MDEP) is the relevant Customer Key policy. Record both Get-M365DataAtRestEncryptionPolicy and Get-M365DataAtRestEncryptionPolicyAssignment output, retaining every property returned by the connected service. The Microsoft Learn cmdlet references document summary output and Format-List detail but do not promise a fixed property table, so use the property-preserving export in the PowerShell setup playbook. Get-DataEncryptionPolicy is the separate Exchange-mailbox DEP command and cannot prove Copilot MDEP coverage.
Use the Customer Key Onboarding Service in Validate mode first. It checks such items as distinct subscription IDs, vault location in the stated subscription, recovery configuration, and key operations. Run Enable only after validation succeeds and the change has been approved.
Connect-ExchangeOnline
$multiWorkloadPolicies = @(
Get-M365DataAtRestEncryptionPolicy -ErrorAction Stop |
Select-Object -Property *
)
$multiWorkloadAssignments = @(
Get-M365DataAtRestEncryptionPolicyAssignment -ErrorAction Stop |
Select-Object -Property *
)
$multiWorkloadPolicies | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 20
$multiWorkloadAssignments | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 20
$request = New-CustomerKeyOnboardingRequest `
-Organization '<tenant-guid>' `
-Scenario MDEP `
-Subscription1 '<paid-subscription-1-guid>' `
-KeyIdentifier1 '<first-key-uri>' `
-Subscription2 '<paid-subscription-2-guid>' `
-KeyIdentifier2 '<second-key-uri>' `
-OnboardingMode Validate
$request | Format-List ID, ValidationResult, EnablementResult
$request.FailedValidations
For Exchange mailbox or SharePoint/OneDrive scenarios, use the workload-specific Customer Key process; do not substitute a one-subscription example for the required paired configuration. Exchange-mailbox DEP output is a separate evidence scope and must not be used to satisfy the Copilot multi-workload DEP criterion.
Step 5: Review sensitivity-label and DKE behavior
Review effective user rights, not only a label template. Test VIEW-without-EXTRACT, an OWNER user, user-defined permissions, data-in-use behavior, active Edge-tab behavior if Edge DLP is not deployed, and any external plugin or Graph connector source. Test DKE separately as an intended Copilot exclusion.
Step 6: Review endpoint encryption separately
Use Intune or the organization’s endpoint management evidence to review device encryption. That endpoint review supplements, but does not prove, Microsoft 365 service encryption.
Financial Sector Considerations
- Service versus tenant evidence: Microsoft 365 service encryption is a Microsoft service characteristic. Tenant evidence is limited to the customer-configurable paths in scope; document the boundary rather than manufacturing a tenant-wide setting.
- DKE as an exclusion choice: DKE can be appropriate for content that the organization explicitly decides should not be available to Copilot. Record the business impact before applying it broadly.
- Customer Key ownership: Assign separate subscription/key administrators, preserve backups and recovery procedures, and review key expiry and access changes. Mistakes can interrupt service or permanently affect data availability.
- FIPS evidence: Microsoft currently documents FIPS 140-3 Level 3 validation for the HSM firmware used by Azure Key Vault Premium and Azure Key Vault Managed HSM. A Premium SKU alone is not evidence that a production key is HSM-protected. Capture the key type and current validation reference because validation status can change with firmware and certification updates.
- Evidence retention: Preserve the raw handshake output, relevant connector export, Customer Key onboarding or DEP state, Key Vault/Managed HSM configuration, and manual service review in the evidence repository.
Verification Criteria
- Manual service review: Record the current Microsoft 365 encryption documentation and applicable Service Trust Portal evidence; do not assert a nonexistent tenant-wide portal setting.
- Negotiated TLS: Capture protocol, cipher suite, certificate, endpoint, and timestamp from actual TLS handshakes for representative approved endpoints.
- Legacy TLS exception: If SMTP AUTH is used, review
AllowLegacyTLSClientsand the legacy endpoint exception; plan retirement where it is not approved. - Connector scope: Export and review forced-TLS or mutual-TLS settings only for relevant Exchange connectors; do not use them to prove general Copilot HTTPS encryption.
- Customer Key: If deployed, retain the tenant-level multi-workload DEP (
Get-M365DataAtRestEncryptionPolicy) and its assignment (Get-M365DataAtRestEncryptionPolicyAssignment), onboarding state, and evidence of two distinct paid subscriptions with one vault/HSM per subscription for the multi-workload scenario. Exchange-mailbox DEP output fromGet-DataEncryptionPolicycannot satisfy Copilot MDEP verification. - Key recovery: Verify Azure Key Vault recovery configuration has a 90-day retention period and purge protection; verify Managed HSM purge protection and the applicable recovery settings.
- HSM/key evidence: Verify HSM-protected production keys and retain current FIPS validation evidence when that assurance is required.
- Sensitivity labels: Test EXTRACT outcomes with the documented owner, link-reference, data-in-use, Edge, and external-source exceptions.
- DKE: Confirm the selected DKE content is not returned to Copilot or agents.
- Documentation: Record scope, reviewer, evidence locations, findings, and any exception with an owner and review date.
Additional Resources
- Microsoft 365 encryption
- Technical reference details about encryption in Microsoft 365
- Preparing for TLS 1.2 in Office 365
- Opt in to the Exchange Online endpoint for legacy TLS clients using SMTP AUTH
- How Exchange Online uses TLS to secure email connections
- Customer Key overview
- Set up Customer Key
- Manage Customer Key encryption policies
- Learn about the availability key for Customer Key
- Roll or rotate a Customer Key or an availability key
- Get-M365DataAtRestEncryptionPolicy
- Get-M365DataAtRestEncryptionPolicyAssignment
- Considerations for Microsoft 365 Copilot
- Double Key Encryption
- Azure Key Vault Premium and Managed HSM firmware update
- Related Controls: 2.2 Sensitivity Labels, 2.3 Conditional Access, 2.7 Data Residency, 3.13 FFIEC Alignment, 4.1 Admin Settings & Feature Management
- Playbooks: PowerShell Setup, Portal Walkthrough, Verification & Testing