Control 2.8: Encryption (Data in Transit and at Rest) — Verification & Testing
Control 2.8 requires a manual evidence pack. The tests below deliberately separate evidence that proves an individual negotiated connection from evidence that proves a configured connector, Customer Key deployment, or Microsoft-managed service boundary.
Test cases
Test 1: Microsoft 365 service-encryption review
- Objective: Record the Microsoft-managed service encryption boundary without inventing a tenant-wide portal setting.
- Steps:
- Review the current Microsoft 365 encryption documentation.
- Review the current technical encryption reference.
- Obtain the applicable Service Trust Portal report through the organization’s approved process.
- Record source version/date, workload scope, reviewer, and limitation.
- Expected result: The evidence pack identifies Microsoft-managed service assurances and clearly distinguishes them from tenant-configurable evidence.
- Evidence: Documentation review record and approved Service Trust Portal artifact.
Test 2: Actual TLS handshake
- Objective: Capture the protocol and cipher suite actually negotiated with representative approved Microsoft 365 endpoints.
- Steps:
- Run Script 1 from a representative managed client/network location.
- Retain the raw JSON output, endpoint inventory reference, timestamp, protocol, cipher suite, and certificate data.
- Verify that each recorded negotiation is TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3.
- If TLS 1.3 is not negotiated, record that it is service- and client-dependent rather than declaring it unavailable across Microsoft 365.
- Expected result: Each sampled endpoint has timestamped TLS 1.2+ negotiated-handshake evidence.
- Evidence: Raw handshake output and approved endpoint inventory reference.
What this test does not prove
A successful sample does not prove every Microsoft 365 endpoint, client, proxy path, or service-to-service flow. It is a scoped observation that must be paired with Microsoft service documentation and the organization’s endpoint inventory.
Test 3: Exchange connector and legacy SMTP AUTH exception
- Objective: Review forced-TLS or mutual-TLS settings only where the tenant uses those Exchange mail-flow paths.
- Steps:
- Run Script 2.
- For each relevant connector, review TLS requirement, certificate identity, partner domain, and smart-host configuration.
- Review
AllowLegacyTLSClientsonly for SMTP AUTH use. - If the legacy SMTP AUTH endpoint is enabled, document the exception owner, affected devices, compensating controls, and retirement plan.
- Expected result: Connector evidence matches approved connector design, and any SMTP AUTH legacy TLS exception is explicitly governed.
- Evidence: Connector export, approval/change record, and legacy-exception record where applicable.
Test 4: Multi-workload Customer Key DEP, configuration, and onboarding validation
- Objective: Verify the tenant-level multi-workload Customer Key DEP (
MDEP) and its assignment without accepting Exchange-mailbox evidence or a single-subscription design as Copilot coverage. - Steps:
- Run
Get-M365DataAtRestEncryptionPolicyandGet-M365DataAtRestEncryptionPolicyAssignmentafter connecting to Exchange Online. Preserve every returned property and the property names, using Script 3. - Confirm both a tenant-level multi-workload DEP policy and its tenant assignment are present and match the approved Copilot scenario.
Get-DataEncryptionPolicyis Exchange-mailbox DEP evidence only and cannot satisfy this test. - Record two different paid Azure subscription IDs in the Customer Key scenario evidence.
- Verify one Azure Key Vault (Standard or Premium) vault or Managed HSM instance in each subscription for the scenario; if Azure Key Vault is used for production data, confirm the Premium SKU and HSM-protected keys.
- For Azure Key Vault, verify 90-day soft-delete retention and purge protection; for Managed HSM, verify purge protection and the configured recovery or soft-delete retention settings.
- Verify production keys are HSM-protected where that design is required.
- Run the Customer Key Onboarding Service in
Validatemode and retain the property-preserving onboarding request output. - Before enabling, confirm
ValidationResultis successful. Retain enablement evidence only after approved enablement completes. - Expected result: The multi-workload DEP policy and tenant assignment are both present; the onboarding record verifies two unique subscriptions and the correct recovery/key configuration; it reports no unresolved validation failure.
- Evidence: Multi-workload DEP policy/assignment export, subscription/vault/HSM export, onboarding request output, and change approval. Exchange-mailbox DEP output cannot replace the multi-workload evidence.
Test 5: Sensitivity-label encryption and Copilot behavior
- Objective: Verify documented EXTRACT behavior and exceptions rather than asserting that encrypted content is categorically inaccessible.
- Steps:
- Test a requesting user with VIEW but no EXTRACT. Confirm Copilot does not summarize the encrypted item and can reference it with a link.
- Test an OWNER user. Confirm that OWNER includes EXTRACT and record the expected outcome.
- Test an unopened SharePoint/OneDrive item encrypted with user-defined permissions, a direct
/reference where supported, and the same item open in an Office app. - If Edge DLP is not deployed, test the active encrypted browser-tab exception and record the result.
- Test each external plugin or Graph connector source separately; do not assume sensitivity labels/encryption applied to external data are recognized by Microsoft Copilot Chat.
- Test a DKE-protected item separately. Confirm that it is not returned by Copilot/agents and that Copilot cannot be used in the app while the DKE item is open.
- Expected result: Outcomes match the documented user, source, and surface boundary; deviations have an owner and escalation path.
- Evidence: Test matrix with user role/rights, source, surface, expected result, actual result, date, and tester.
Test 6: Current HSM validation evidence
- Objective: Confirm the organization has current evidence for the HSM assurance level it requires.
- Steps:
- Record the actual key type and service configuration.
- For Azure Key Vault Premium or Managed HSM, review the current firmware validation notice.
- Record the current validation reference and review date; recheck after firmware or certification changes.
- Expected result: The evidence names the actual HSM-backed key configuration and current validation source, not only a vault SKU.
- Evidence: Key configuration export and validation-reference review record.
Evidence collection
| Evidence item | Format | Scope / limitation | Storage location |
|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft service-encryption review | Review record + approved service-assurance artifact | Microsoft-managed service boundary; not a tenant setting | Compliance evidence repository |
| Negotiated TLS handshake | JSON/text | Representative endpoint/client/network observation | Compliance evidence repository |
| Exchange connector export | JSON/text | Only configured partner/hybrid/forced-TLS or mutual-TLS mail paths | Compliance evidence repository |
| SMTP AUTH legacy exception record | Change/exception record | Only smtp-legacy use controlled by AllowLegacyTLSClients |
Compliance evidence repository |
| Multi-workload Customer Key DEP/assignment and onboarding state | JSON/text | Tenant-level Copilot MDEP policy and assignment; Exchange-mailbox DEP output is a separate scope | Compliance evidence repository |
| Azure Key Vault/Managed HSM configuration | JSON/text + portal export | Subscription, recovery, key type, and role configuration | Compliance evidence repository |
| Sensitivity-label/DKE test matrix | Test record | User/source/surface-specific behavior | Compliance evidence repository |
Compliance mapping
| Regulation | Requirement | How this control supports it |
|---|---|---|
| GLBA §501(b) | Safeguards for customer information | Documents encryption evidence and key-management boundaries for Copilot data flows. |
| NYDFS Part 500 §500.15 | Encryption of NPI in transit and at rest based on risk assessment | Supports a risk-based review of transport, at-rest, and key-management evidence. |
| FFIEC IT Examination Handbook | Cryptographic controls | Supports examination-ready evidence of actual handshakes, key configuration, and exception decisions. |
- Back to Control 2.8.